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This research examines the impact of framing and base size of computer security 
risk information on users’ risk perceptions and behavior (i.e., download intention and 
download decision). It also examines individual differences (i.e., demographic factors, 
computer security awareness, Internet structural assurance, self-efficacy, and general 
risk-taking tendencies) associated with users’ computer security risk perceptions. This 
research draws on Prospect Theory, which is a theory in behavioral economics that 
addresses risky decision-making, to generate hypotheses related to users’ decision-
making in the computer security context. A 2 × 3 mixed factorial experimental design (N 
= 178) was conducted to assess the effect of framing and base size on users’ download 
intentions and decisions. The results show that framing and base size of computer 
security risk information are associated with users’ perceived risk and risk-taking 
behavior. More specifically, negative framing and large base size increase users’ 
perceived risk and reduce users’ risk-taking behavior. Moreover, users who have greater 
general risk-taking tendencies and perceive higher Internet structural assurance exhibited 
lower risk perceptions and greater risk-taking behavior in the computer security context. 
The findings from this research suggest that using negative framing and large base size to 
communicate computer security risk information is an effective way to lower risk-taking 
behavior of users.  
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Computer security threats are common on the Internet. To reduce cybersecurity 
risks and protect users’ private information, computer security scientists are working 
toward providing security warnings, security indicators, pop-up windows, and other types 
of warning systems when users are at risk of cybersecurity threats. Users play a 
fundamental role in identification and prevention of computer threats (Stanton et al., 
2004). They are expected to assess cybersecurity threats before they conduct online 
transactions, access a URL, or download files or applications. For example, users make 
decisions related to downloading software from anonymous sources and providing 
personal information to conduct online transactions. Their choices could bring negative 
outcomes, such as data and information leakage and damage to their personal computer.  
A report by IBM indicates that more than 95% of the security occurrences in IBM 
were attributed to human errors (IBM Corporation, 2014). As the “weakest link” in the 
security chain, people sometimes fail to detect threats. Users’ ability to identify security 
risks is crucial in an online environment. Therefore, it is important to study users’ 
behavior in the computer security context. 
Identification of security risks is dependent on users’ perceptions and behavior 
toward potential threats. Some of the previous studies on cyber threats have focused on 
comparing physical or structural cues and miscues (Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz, 2006; 
Darwish & Bataineh, 2012; Smith et al., 2016). They also looked at Internet users’ ability 
to interpret cues and miscues that are embedded in web pages or emails. Moreover, 
researchers have studied human factors that are associated with users’ online behavior, 
including individual differences, gender differences, human cognitive limitations, and 
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other factors influencing how users distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent 
messages (Dhamija et al., 2006; Downs et al., 2006). 
Aytes and Conolly’s (2004) decision model suggests that users’ online behavior is 
driven by their assessment of the outcomes of risk-averse and risk-taking actions. Their 
study shows the importance of cybersecurity knowledge and awareness, as well as the 
impact of hazard attitudes on behavior. A crucial aspect of users’ behavior in 
cybersecurity is how users assess and perceive the messages of computer threat warnings. 
Thus, users’ risk perceptions play a crucial role in attaining computer security.  
The goal of this research is to explore how computer security risk information can 
be presented to reduce users’ risk-taking decision-making and behavior. A laboratory 
experiment was conducted to examine the impact of framing of cyber security scenarios 
and presentation of risk information of different base sizes on users’ risk perceptions and 
behavior. Specifically, we are interested in studying whether negatively framed messages 
give rise to risk-averse actions more than positively framed messages and whether 
increasing the base size of the evidence of computer threats decreases users’ risk-taking 
behavior.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related 
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical foundation and hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the research methodology, design, and procedure. Section 5 and Section 6 
present and discuss the findings. The limitations and future research directions are 
presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the thesis. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research on usable computer security has focused on understanding human factors 
and improving systems to foster safer user behavior in the context of computer security. 
This section provides a review of the literature on human factors in computer security, 
especially in the context of users’ susceptibility to cyber-attacks.  
 
2.1. COMPUTER SECURITY DECISION-MAKING 
Understanding the human cognition and decision-making process is key to explain 
users’ behavior when faced with cybersecurity threats. Hence, we need to open up the 
‘black box’ in order to understand users’ cyber decisions, such as decisions to click through 
a link embedded in an email, download files from websites, or enter personal information 
on e-commerce websites or social media. 
Several studies have focused on developing better interface and warning design to 
get the attention of users in order to foster safer cybersecurity behavior. Researchers have 
studied security warnings from multiple perspectives. In a laboratory study to assess the 
effectiveness of phishing warnings, it was found that more than 90% of the participants 
fell into the trap of phishing emails without any warnings (Egelman et al., 2008). On the 
contrary, when active warnings were popped up on the screen, 79% of the participants 
avoided the phishing attack. Based on these findings, it was recommended that warnings 
or indicators be provided to convey recommended actions to users even though they may 
interrupt the users’ work. In a large-scale field study that assessed the effectiveness of 
browser security warnings on the Firefox and Chrome’s telemetry platform, it was found 
that more participants entered personal information when there were no active warning 
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indicators than when active warning indicators were provided (Akhawe & Felt, 2013). 
The findings in another study indicate that opinionated framing or design increases 
adherence by users through decreasing the rate of click-through of SSL warnings (Felt et 
al., 2015).  
Smith, Nah, and Cheng (2016) examined user assessment of security levels in e-
commerce by varying cues/miscues (i.e., HTTP vs. HTTPS, fraudulent vs. authentic 
URL, padlocks beside fields) presented on web pages. They conducted a within-subjects 
experiment where users rated their perceived security, trustworthiness, and safety after 
examining each of the e-commerce web pages that vary in these cues/miscues. They 
found that padlocks provided beside a field (i.e., miscues) do not affect user perceptions 
of security but primed subjects to look for more important security cues, such as HTTP 
vs. HTTPS. 
 
2.2. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO COMPUTER SECURITY THREATS 
Human factors, such as past experience, culture, and concerns with Internet 
security, are expected to influence user security behaviors. In a study that investigated the 
relationship between demographic characteristics and phishing susceptibility, participants 
were asked to complete a background survey before they proceeded to a roleplay on 
phishing, where they were asked to click on a phishing link or enter personal information 
on phishing websites (Sheng et al., 2010). The study discovered two predictors of 
phishing susceptibility: gender and age. Specifically, the results indicated that women 
were more likely than men to fall into the phishing trap. The authors provided a possible 
reason for the gender difference by suggesting that women tend to have less technical 
knowledge than men. Moreover, individuals of 18-25 years of age were more susceptible 
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to phishing. This group appears to be more susceptible because participants in this age 
group have lower levels of education, less experience on the Internet, and less of an 
aversion to risks. 
Flores, Holm, Nohlberg, and Ekstedt (2015) examined the influence of 
demographic, cultural, and personal factors on phishing. Participants from nine 
organizations in Sweden, USA, and India participated in their survey to compare users’ 
behavior in response to phishing attacks across users of different cultural backgrounds. 
The results did not indicate any relationship between phishing and age or gender, but they 
found that intention to resist social engineering, formal IS training, computer experience, 
and computer security awareness have a significant effect on reactions to phishing. 
Additionally, the results indicate that the correlation between phishing determinants and 
employees’ actual phishing behavior differs between Swedish, US, and Indian 
employees. 
In a study by Goel, Williams, and Dincelli (2017), phishing emails were sent to 
more than 7000 undergraduate students and their responses to the phishing emails were 
recorded. The phishing message contained different rewards, such as a gift card, tuition 
assist, and a bank card. The results show that susceptibility varies across users with 
different demographics (i.e., major and gender). Females were more likely to open 
phishing emails, with an overall rate of 29.9% compared to 24.4% among males, and the 
rate varies based on the content in the emails. Participants with business education 
background had the highest opening/clicking link rate compared to those with social 
science, business and STEM background. Based on the results, the authors suggest 




In another study that examined the effect of gender and personality on phishing, 
females were found to be more vulnerable to phishing (Halevi et al., 2013). In their study, 
53% of women were phished as compared to 14% of men. The authors attributed the 
behavior to females being more comfortable with online shopping and digital 
communication than males. Moreover, they found that people who fell into the phishing 
trap have very high neuroticism. A possible explanation that neuroticism could result in 
susceptibility to phishing attacks is that neuroticism may cause people to be more upset 
when being deceived and therefore, people rather believe that things and people are 
generally truthful. 
Vishwanath (2015) studied the influence of e-mail habits and cognitive processing 
on phishing susceptibility. Phishing emails were sent to college students to assess their 
responses. The students were asked to complete a survey on their background and 
demographic information. The results indicate that e-mail habits are determined by 
individual personality traits of conscientiousness and emotional stability, and cognitive 
processing was premised on information adequacy. Basically, there are two routes of 
cognitive processing: heuristically and systematically (Chaiken & Eagly, 1989). Heuristic 
processing uses judgmental rules that are learned and stored in memory, whereas 
systematic processing includes comprehensive and analytic processing of judgement-
relevant information. This study found that heuristic processing and strength of email 
habits led to an increase in victimization. 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the influence of user characteristics on 





Table 2.1. Summary of Research on Susceptibility to Computer Security Threats 
Reference Research Focus Summary of Findings 
Sheng et al., 
2010 
Investigated the relationship 
between demographic 
characteristics and phishing 
susceptibility 
Females are more susceptible to phishing 
email than males.18-25-year-old 
individuals formed the most susceptible 
age group. 
Flores et al., 
2015 
Examined the influence of 
demographic, cultural, and 
personal factors on phishing 
The results did not find any relationship 
between phishing and age or gender, but 
they found that intention to resist social 
engineering, formal IS training, 
computer experience, and computer 
security awareness have a significant 
effect on reactions to phishing. 
Goel et al., 
2017 
Explored if susceptibility 
varies across users with 
different demographics (i.e., 
major and gender) 
Females were more likely to open 
phishing emails, with an overall rate of 
29.9% comparing to 24.4% among 
males, but the rate varies based on the 
content in the emails. Participants with 
business education background had the 
highest opening/clicking link rate 
compared to those with social science, 
business and STEM background.	
Halevi et al., 
2013 
Examined the effect of 
gender and personality on 
phishing 
Females were found to be more 
vulnerable to phishing. Neuroticism is 




Studied the influence of e-
mail habits and cognitive 
processing on phishing 
susceptibility 
Heuristic processing and email habits led 
to an increase in victimization. 
 
 
2.3. FRAMING EFFECTS IN CYBERSECURITY DECISION-MAKING 
Prospect theory suggests that decision-making under risk depends on whether the 
potential outcome is perceived as a gain or a loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) proposed that choices between options can be affected by the 
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framing of the options. Their findings indicate that people tend to avoid risks under gain 
frames but seek risks under loss frames. Moreover, losses have a greater impact on 
people’s decision-making than gains. In addition, when subjects were required to explain 
their choices, the framing effect tended to be reduced (Larrick et al., 1992). The framing 
effect could be eliminated if users are encouraged to think through the rationale 
underlying their choices (Takemura, 1994). Also, if users are experts in a particular area, 
the framing effect will also be reduced (Davis and Bobko, 1986).  
Various researchers have utilized prospect theory to study users’ behavior in the 
information science field. They evaluate the impact of positively vs. negatively framed 
messages on users’ decision-making, including financial decisions (Brewer & Kramer, 
1986), idealness of messages, perceived prominence (Aaker & Lee, 2001), and threat 
awareness (Lee & Aaker, 2004).  
However, the results of empirical studies on the effect of framing are not 
consistent. An experiment conducted by Rosoff, Cui, and John (2013) examined the 
effect of gain and loss framing on user decisions, including downloading a music file, 
installing a plug-in for an online game, and downloading a media player to legally stream 
video. The study investigated whether and how human decision-making depends on gain-
loss framing and the salience of a prior near-miss experience. They examined one kind of 
near-miss experience, resilient near-miss, which refers to the case where a user had a 
near-miss experience on a cyber-attack. They carried out a 2 x 2 factorial design and 
manipulated two levels of each of the two independent variables: frame (gain vs. loss 
framing) and previous near-miss experience (absence vs. presence). Their results indicate 
that users tend to follow a safe practice when they have prior experience with a near-miss 
cyber-attack. They also concluded that females are more likely to select a risky choice 
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compared to males. Unexpectedly, the results suggest that subjects were indifferent 
between safe versus risky decision options when the outcomes were framed as gains or 
losses. 
Cybersecurity researchers also expand the definition of “gain-loss” framing. In 
Valecha et al.’s (2016) study, “gain” was operationalized using a reward-based phishing 
email and “loss” was operationalized using a risk-based phishing email. Reward-based 
persuasion is designed to attract users by offering a reward or benefit. For example, 
emails that inform the recipient about winning a lottery. On the other hand, risk-based 
persuasion is designed to scare people by highlighting a potential risk. The study found 
that the presence of both reward-based persuasion (gain frame) and risk-based persuasion 
(loss frame) increase response likelihood.  
Chen, Gates, Li, and Proctor (2015) conducted three experiments to assess the 
influence of negatively and positively framed summary of risk information on app-
installation decisions. Risk information was framed as the amount of risk (negative 
framing) or amount of safety (positive framing) in the experimental conditions. The 
results suggest that the summary that was positively framed (as the amount of safety) has 
a greater effect on app-installation decisions than the negatively framed (as the amount of 
risk) summary. Hence, a valid index that is framed positively by focusing on safety can 
be developed to increase users’ app-installation decisions. 






Table 2.2. Summary of Research on Framing Effects on Decision-Making 




Impact of monetary losses 
and gains on users’ 
behavior 
Users perceived losses more seriously 
than gains. 
Beebe et al., 
2014  
Effect of framing of 
messages on user’s 
financial decision 
Users tend to be more risk-taking when 
presented with a case of financial losses 
than gains. 
Chen et al., 
2015  
The influence of summary 
risk information on app-
installation decisions 
Positive framing (safety index) decreases 
users’ risk-taking behavior 
Rosoff et al., 
2013  
The influence of gain-loss 
framing on decision-
making  
Subjects were indifferent between safe 
versus risky decision options when the 
outcomes were framed as gains or losses. 
Valecha et 
al., 2016 
The effect of reward-based 
vs. risk-based phishing 
email on response 
Both reward-based and risk-based 





3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES 
Section 3 review theories from behavioral science and psychology to provide the 
foundation for this research.  
 
3.1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
We draw on theories from behavioral science and psychology to provide the 
foundation for this research. Specifically, we draw on the principles of decision making 
under risks and uncertainty in Prospect Theory to analyze user perceptions associated 
with computer security, and Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior, 
and Technology Acceptance Model to generate hypotheses on user behavior in the 
context of computer security.  
3.1.1. Prospect Theory. People do not always make rational decisions because 
they value gains and losses differently. Prospect theory is a descriptive theory that 
focuses on this phenomenon and addresses how people make decisions when they are 
facing choices involving risks and uncertainty (e.g., different likelihood of gains and 
losses). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) proposed that people make choices based on the 
phrasing or framing of the options. They also explored how different framing affects 
choices in a hypothetical life and death situation in 1981, which is known as the “Asian 
disease problem”. The subjects were told that “the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of 
an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people” (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981, p. 453). They were provided with two options, one predicted to result in 400 
deaths, whereas the other one predicted 33% chance that everyone would live and 67% 
chance that everyone would die.  
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Half of the subjects were given two positively framed options: 
A. 200 people will be saved (a certain outcome) 
B. 1/3 probability of saving 600 people and 2/3 probability of saving none 
(an uncertain outcome) 
The other half of the subjects were given two negatively framed options: 
C. 400 people will die (a certain outcome) 
D. 1/3 probability that none will die and 2/3 probability that 600 will die (an 
uncertain outcome) 
Expected Utility Theory (Mongin, 1997), which is an alternate theory to prospect 
theory in decision-making, assumes that the choice people made is of the highest 
satisfaction to the decision maker. From the perspective of Expected Utility Theory, the 
two options (i.e., a certain one and an uncertain one) in positive framing are 
mathematically equivalent to the two options in negative framing since they provide the 
same utility (satisfaction). “200 people will be saved” implies that among 600 people, 
there are 200 people will surely be saved, so one-third of the 600 people will not die. 
While “400 people will die” in the negative frame implies that two-thirds of the 600 
people will die. As a result, subjects are expected to choose the option in a similar way 
regardless of the frame of the problem. In other words, based on Expected Utility Theory, 
the percentage of risky choices is expected to be the same (or at least similar) in both 
framing. 
Surprisingly, in the positively framed scenario, 72% of the subjects selected the 
certain option and 28% selected the risky option. On the contrary, in the negatively 
framed scenario, only 22% of the subjects selected the certain outcome and 78% selected 
the risky option. The results suggest that when provided with positive prospects, people 
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are more willing to go for the certainty of saving 200 people and refuse the possibility 
that no one will be saved. On the other hand, when provided with negative prospects, 
people would rather pursue the option with uncertainty, due to the fear of a large loss of 
400 people’s lives. In other words, people have the tendency to avoid losses and optimize 
for sure wins since the pain of losing is greater than the satisfaction of an equivalent gain. 
Thus, people are risk-averse in positive framing and risk seeking in negative framing. 
This phenomenon that is termed “Framing Effect” describes a common cognitive bias in 
decision-making.  
Prospect theory uses two factors to explain the framing effect: the reference point, 
and the value function. The reference point refers to the status quo, determining how the 
outcomes are framed, either positively or negatively. When outcomes are greater than the 
reference point, they will be considered as gains, while they will be considered as losses 
when the outcomes are less than the reference point. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) used 
a value function to explain and depict the difference in risk preferences among choices 
involving gains and losses. The value function is a cubic parabola type curve, which is 
nearly asymmetrical in gain and loss domains (see Figure 3.1). The gain side is concave 
which suggests that people are risk-averse when people make choices involving gains, 
whereas the loss side of the curve is convex, indicating that people tend to be risk-seeking 
when they make choices involving losses. Moreover, the value function is steeper for 
losses than gains, representing individuals weighing losses more heavily than gains. 
In the “Asian disease” problem, the reference points in each framing are different. 
The positive framing refers to saving lives, so the status quo is “zero people saved”, thus 
both options suggest a potential gain. In the opposite, the negatively framed problem 
refers to death. The reference point, in this case, is “zero people died” so the two options 
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can be viewed as losses. Drawing on the value function, the result of the Asian Disease 
problem can be explained as follows: the risky option is preferred in negative framing 
because people are risk-seeking in order to avoid larger losses; the option with certainty 
is preferred in positive framing because people are risk-averse and more willing to go 




Figure 3.1. Value Function 
 
 
3.1.2. Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory of Planned Behavior. Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) provide a theoretical 
foundation for modelling users’ behavior in the computer security context. 
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TRA is a psychology theory that links people’s attitude and behavior (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1967). It examines the relationship among attitude, subjective norm, behavioral 
intention, and behavior. This theory states that individual’s behavior is based on their pre-
existing attitudes and behavioral intentions. Basically, one’s decision to engage in a 
particular behavior is based on motivation to perform the behavior, which can be 
considered as the individual’s expectation of the outcome of performing a particular 
action. To be more specific, people’s behavioral intention to perform a behavior is the 
main predictor of their actual behavior. Behavioral intention is the intention to perform 
the behavior, which precedes the actual behavior and is determined by attitudes and 
subjective norms. 
TPB focuses on explaining the relationships between attitude, subjective norm, 
perceptional behavioral control, behavioral intention, and behavior (Ajzen, 1991). It 
proposes that one’s behavioral intention is shaped by attitude toward behavior, subjective 
norms, and perceived behavioral control, while behavioral intention is the key predictor 
of behavior. As an extension of TRA, TPA includes behavioral control as an additional 
determinant of intention and behavior. In sum, to predict whether an individual intends to 
perform a behavior, we need to know whether the person is in favor of performing the 
action (i.e., attitude), how much social pressure the person feels about performing the 
action (i.e., subjective norm), and whether the person feels in control of performing the 
action (i.e., perceived behavioral control).  
TRA and TPB are often applied in behavioral research. Figure 3.2 shows the 
combined model of TRA and TPB, which includes the following key concepts: 
• Behavioral Beliefs. This concept explores people’s motivations of a 
particular behavior in terms of the behavior’s outcome. In fact, people tend to associate 
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the performance of a particular behavior with a set of outcomes or features. For instance, 
if a person believes that preparation for a test leads to success, the behavioral belief is 
that preparation is associated with success whereas no preparation is associated with 
failure. 
• Evaluations of the Behavioral Outcome. This concept refers to how people 
perceive and evaluate the potential outcomes of performing a behavior. 
• Attitudes. It is one of the key determinants of behavioral intention and 
addresses the way people feel about a particular behavior. Attitudes are influenced by 
behavioral beliefs and evaluation of the behavioral outcome. 
• Normative Beliefs. It refers to a person’s perception of social normative 
pressures or other relevant beliefs that determine whether or not he or she should perform 
the behavior. 
• Motivation to Comply. This concept focuses on whether a person will 
comply with social normative pressures.  
• Subjective Norms. Ajzen (1991) defines this term as “perceived social 
pressure to perform or not perform the behavior”. It is one of the key determinants of 
behavioral intention. It refers to the fact that one’s perception of the particular behavior is 
influenced by his or her surrounding, such as family members and friends. 
• Control Beliefs. It refers to an individual’s beliefs about the presence of 
factors that may assist or impede the performance of the particular behavior. 
• Perceived Power. This concept refers to the perceived presence of factors 
that may assist or impede the performance of the particular behavior. 
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• Perceived Control. It is one of the key determinants of behavioral 
intention. It is defined as a person’s perceived ease or difficulty of performing the 
particular behavior. 
• Intention. This refers to the motivational factors that influence a given 
behavior where the stronger the intention to perform the behavior, the more likely the 




Figure 3.2. Theory of Planned Behavior and Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
 
3.1.3. Technology Acceptance Model. Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is 
an adaptation of TRA/TPB and it is an information system theory that models users’ 
acceptance of information technology (Davis et al., 1989). TAM replaces some of 
TRA/TPB’s measures of attitude with two technology acceptance measures, perceived 
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ease of use and perceived usefulness. The model proposes that users’ acceptance of a 
system is directly determined by behavioral intention to use the system, which is in turn 
determined by the users’ attitudes toward the technology and the perceived usefulness of 
the technology. Moreover, attitude and perceived usefulness are influenced by perceived 
ease of use (see Figure 3.3). Perceived usefulness reflects an individual’s belief in the 
system, and it is positively related to attitude toward using the system and behavioral 
intention to use the system. Perceived ease of use is defined as a person’s belief that 




Figure 3.3. Technology Acceptance Model 
 
 
3.2. HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH MODEL  
Prospect theory purports that individuals weigh losses more heavily than gains. 
Hence, the framing of outcomes affects users’ perceptions because losses exert a stronger 
influence over people’s perceptions than gains. We extend the term “gains and losses” to 
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two different and opposite ways to present information. When a situation is framed 
negatively, the negative consequences or attributes are emphasized. When a situation is 
positively framed, the positive aspects are more salient. For example, the Asian Disease 
problem can be presented as “400 of 600 people will be saved” or “200 of 600 people 
will die”; similarly, a piece of meat can be presented as “75% fat-free” or “25% fat”.  
Based on prospect theory, we hypothesize that the framing of the possible 
consequences of a risky action affects users’ perceived risk. Specifically, negative 
framing leads to greater perceived risk than positive framing because losses exert a 
stronger influence over people’s perceptions than gains. Positive framing is in the domain 
of gains as it highlights the assurance of keeping the computer system secure whereas 
negative framing is in the domain of losses as it accentuates the hazard to computer 
security. Such an explanation is consistent with prospect theory and it extends prospect 
theory by suggesting that the perception of risks occurs prior to behavior. Based on 
prospect theory, people perceive losses greater than gains, and hence, the perception of 
risks is higher in negative framing (which involves losses) than positive framing (which 
involves gains). 
H1: Risk perception is higher in negative framing than positive framing.  
Several researchers replicated Tversky and Kahneman’s “Asian disease problem” 
study to extend prospect theory. Levin et al. (1990) found that different amounts of 
evidence in the Asian Disease problem affected decision-making. In fact, “1 out of 100 
people will die” was found to be less trustable than “100 out of 10000 people will die” 
because the former might be considered a contingency whereas the latter represents a 
more reliable probability of death. Wang and Johnston (1995) further extended the 
“Asian Disease Problem” study by varying the number of people (6, 60, 600 and 6000) in 
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both gain and loss conditions. Their results revealed that under small base size conditions 
(i.e., 2 out of 6 people live and 20 out of 60 people live), participants tended to be more 
risk seeking than those who were presented with the large base size conditions (200 out 
of 600 people live and 2000 out of 6000 people live). Hence, the following hypothesis is 
proposed. 
H2: The greater the base size, the higher the perceived risk. 
The findings from Wang and Johnston’s (1995) study provide further evidence on 
how base size influences the effect of framing. Their results demonstrate that base size 
interacts with framing effects to influence risk-taking behavior. When the base size was 6 
and 60, the percentages of subjects who chose the risky option in negative and positive 
framing were very similar (64% and 70% respectively for base size of 6 and 68% and 
65% respectively for base size of 60) but the difference between negative and positive 
framing increases with larger base sizes. In the larger base size conditions (600 and 
6000), the framing effect led to more risk-taking decisions in negative framing than 
positive framing. This effect was stronger in the large base size conditions than the small 
base size conditions. A possible reason is that subjects valued individuals in a small 
group context more heavily than individuals in a large group context (Wang, 1996). In 
other words, in a small base size context, people are able to ignore the irrelevant cue of 
framing and thus the framing effect does not affect their choices.  
According to this extension of Prospect Theory, we hypothesize that risk 
information is more powerful when it is based on a large base size. As base size 
increases, the effect of framing on perceived risk becomes stronger. In other words, 




H3: As base size increases, framing effect on perceived risk becomes stronger.  
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), and 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) provide theoretical foundation for us to examine 
users’ behavior on software download. According to these theories, behavioral intention 
is the key predictor of actual behavior. In turn, behavioral intention is determined by 
three factors in TPB (i.e., attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived 
behavioral control) and by two factors in TAM (i.e., attitude toward using and perceived 
usefulness). In the TPB/TRA model, attitude is one of the key determinants of behavioral 
intention and addresses the way people feel about a particular behavior. Attitudes are 
influenced by behavioral beliefs and evaluation of the behavioral outcome, and attitudes 
refer to one’s judgment about whether it is good/safe or bad/dangerous to perform a 
behavior. In the computer security context, where the particular download behavior is 
associated with computer security risks, the download intention is the key predictor of the 
download decision. In other words, the stronger the intention to engage in the download 
behavior, the more likely the user will make the decision to perform the download action.  
Moreover, the download intention is affected by users’ attitude toward 
downloading the software, and perceived risk refers to users’ attitude regarding the 
download behavior. We thus hypothesize that the higher the perceived risk, the lower the 
behavioral download intention, which in turn, decreases the likelihood of performing the 
download behavior.  
H4: The greater the perceived risk, the lower the download intention. 
 H5: Download intention is positively associated with the download decision. 
Stimulus-Response theory of behavior deals with people's response to a stimulus. 
Psychologists increasingly question the view that human behavior cannot be completely 
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explained without taking the internal/mental processes into consideration. The Stimulus-
Organism-Response (SOR) theory (Woodworth, 1918), as an extension of the Stimuli-
Response formula, suggests that a stimulus may arouse different behavior or response 
depending on the state of the “organism”. The “organism” mediates the relationship 
between the stimulus and the human’s behavior. Basically, the stimulus elicits human’s 
behavior based on a mental process of people. SOR theory has been applied successfully 
in the IS field to explain customer behavior in the e-commerce context and on social 
media usage (Jeong et al., 2009). It also provides a lucid outline to study how the framing 
of a risky scenario influences users’ download intention and decision. Thus, the SOR 
model can work as an overarching framework in this study. 
Drawing on SOR Theory, Prospect Theory, TBA, TPB, and TAM, five 
hypotheses have been generated and the research model is shown in Figure 3.4. Framing 
and base size of risk information act as the external stimuli that influence users’ 
perceived risk, which further influences users’ download intention and behavior, which 




Figure 3.4. Research Model 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A 2 (positive/negative framing) × 3 (small, medium and large base size) mixed 
factorial experimental design was conducted to explore the relationship of framing and 
base size of computer security risk information on users’ behavior.  
 
4.1. SUBJECTS 
Research subjects were recruited through the crowdsourcing website, Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Basically, anyone can complete the tasks on the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk website. The only requirement to carry out the tasks on the Internet and 
collect payment from the requester is to be at least 18 years of age. 
 
4.2. RESEARCH PROCEDURES  
We used a scenario-based survey embedded in an experiment to study users’ 
download behavior. An online survey containing the stimuli in the form of a 
questionnaire was distributed. Subjects were asked to assess five software download 
scenarios of which three of them were the experimental stimuli and two of them were 
distractors, as mentioned earlier.  
The software application in each of the three “within-subjects” scenarios was 
associated with a particular computer security risk, i.e., 10% of those who downloaded 
the software had their computers infected with viruses, while they differ in their base size 
(i.e., number of people who downloaded the software).  
We detailed the scenario as a free download of an expensive software in order to 
assess the trade-off between risk and money. In order to eliminate the influence of the 
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value, type, and importance of one’s personal computer (e.g., important data stored in the 
computer, personal attachment to the computer, etc.), we narrated the situation as 
follows, which is also presented in Appendix A:   
“You just bought a new personal computer and have not installed any software or 
stored any file or information on it. You need to install 5 software applications for 
a project. 
Next, you will be given a series of scenarios. Each scenario is related to 
downloading 1 of the 5 software applications. Each of the scenarios is standalone 
and independent of one another.” 
Then, subjects were provided with different manipulations of a message related to 
the computer security risk associated with the download. After reviewing each message, 
subjects needed to respond to a series of questions designed to assess their risk 
perception, intention, and decision.  
 
4.3. VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
Framing was operationalized as a between-subjects variable and base size as a 
within-subjects variable. All the subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two 
(positive or negative) framing conditions. In each framing condition, subjects made a 
software download decision for each of three scenarios involving varying base sizes (i.e., 
small, medium and large). Moreover, two scenarios were added as distractors in order to 
mask the systematic pattern among the three main scenarios. The five scenarios, which 
included the three main scenarios for small, medium and large base size and the two 




4.3.1. Framing. Framing was first studied based on the Asian disease problem, 
also referred to as “framing of the options”. Later on, researchers discussed and explored 
other types of framing manipulations, such as attribute framing and goal framing (Levin 
et al., 1998). As an example of attribute framing, a risky situation can be framed by the 
salience of the outcome including the negative or positive aspects. For example, a 
download with 10% virus infection rate could be framed in different ways: 9 out of 10 
people’s computers were secure vs. 1 out of 10 people’s computers were infected with 
viruses. In this study, framing is a between-subjects variable where subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of the two framing conditions.  
In the positive framing condition, the description of the scenarios focused on the 
positive outcome of downloading the software: 
“Among X people who downloaded the software: 
Y people’s computers were safe and secure” 
In the negative framing condition, the scenario focused on the negative outcome 
of downloading the software:  
 “Among X people who downloaded the software: 
Z person’s computer was infected with viruses and crashed unexpectedly” 
4.3.2. Base Size. Base size is a within-subjects variable. We manipulated three 
levels of the base size: 10, 1000, and 100000 (i.e., a difference of 100 times between 
levels) in order to observe users’ perceived risk as base size increased. In order to mask 
the systematic patterns of the base size manipulations from the subjects, two analogous 
scenarios (with different computer security risk levels and frequencies) were inserted as 
distractors. The five scenarios were presented in a randomized order to counter-balance 
any potential ordering effect. 
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In the positively framed condition, subjects made download decisions presented 
in Table 4.1. In the negatively framed condition, subjects made download decisions 
presented in Table 4.2. The three main scenarios for each of positive and negative 
framing conditions are also presented in Appendix B.  
 
 
Table 4.1. Operationalization of Base Size in Positive Framing 
Base Size Paragraph (Positive Framing) 
Theta Software 
(Small Base Size: 10) 
Among 10 people who downloaded the software:  
9 people’s computers were safe and secure 
Alpha Software 
(Medium Base Size: 1,000) 
Among 1,000 people who downloaded the software: 
900 people’s computers were safe and secure 
Zeta Software 
(Large Base Size: 100,000) 
Among 100,000 people who downloaded the software: 
90,000 people’s computers were safe and secure 
 
 
Table 4.2. Operationalization of Base Size in Negative Framing 
Base Size Paragraph (Negative Framing) 
Theta Software 
(Small Base Size: 10) 
Among 10 people who downloaded the software:  
1 person’s computer was infected with viruses and 
crashed unexpectedly 
Alpha Software 
(Medium Base Size: 1,000) 
Among 1,000 people who downloaded the software: 
100 people’s computers were infected with viruses 
and crashed unexpectedly 
Zeta Software 
(Large Base Size: 100,000) 
Among 100,000 people who downloaded the 
software: 10,000 people’s computers were infected 






After each scenario, a short questionnaire was used to assess perceived risk, 
download intention, and download decision. The questionnaire also captured 
Cybersecurity Awareness, Internet Structural Assurance, General Risk-taking 
Tendencies, Computer Security Risk-taking Tendencies, Self-Efficacy, and the 
background and demographic information of the subjects. A manipulation check question 
for framing was presented in the questionnaire. Appendix C and Appendix D present the 
items in the questionnaire. 
4.4.1. Perceived Risk. A three-item scale was developed in this study to assess 
perceived risk. The first item was adopted from Weber et al. (2002) and the two other 
items were self-developed. The 5-point Likert scale (not at all risky/no risk at all = 1 to 
extremely risky/extremely high risk = 5) was used. Table 4.3 shows the items. 
 
 






(PR1) Please indicate how risky you perceive the action of 
downloading this software for free from the uncertified source. 
(PR2) Please indicate the level of risk of downloading this software for 
free from the uncertified source. (Self-developed) 
(PR3) Please rate the riskiness of downloading this software for free 





4.4.2. Download Intention. Subjects were asked to rate their intention to 
download the software. The measurement items for intention were adopted from Ajzen’s 
(1991). The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used. 
Table 4.4 shows the items. 
 
 
Table 4.4. Measurement Scale for Download Intention 
 Measurement Items 
Download 
Intention 
(DI1) I intend to download this software for free from the uncertified 
source. 
(DI2) I plan to download this software for free from the uncertified 
source. 




4.4.3. Download Decision. After assessing download intention and perceived 
risk, subjects were asked to answer a question about their download decision:  
What is your choice of downloading this software? 
• Option 1: Download and pay for the expensive software from the certified 
source with no security risks 
• Option 2: Download the software for free from this uncertified source with the 
security risks indicated above 
4.4.4. General Information Security Awareness. Measurement items were 
adopted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010) to assess subjects’ general information security 
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awareness. The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was 
used. Table 4.5 presents the items. 
 
 
Table 4.5. Measurement Scale for General Information Security Awareness 





(GISA1) Overall, I am aware of potential security threats and their 
negative consequences. 
(GISA2) I have sufficient knowledge about the effect of potential 
security problems. (Revised from original) 




4.4.5. Self-Efficacy. The measurement items for self-efficacy were adopted from 
Dinev and Hu (2007) to assess users’ computer security self-efficacy. The 7-point Likert 
scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used. Table 4.6 presents the items. 
 
 




(SE1) I am confident that I can remove viruses from my computer. 
(SE2) I am confident that I can prevent unauthorized intrusion into my 
computer. 




4.4.6. Cybersecurity Awareness. The measurement items for cybersecurity 
awareness were adopted from Dinev and Hu (2007). The 7-point Likert scale (strongly 
disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used. Table 4.7 presents the items. 
 
 
Table 4.7. Measurement Scale for Cybersecurity Awareness 
 Measurement Items 
Cybersecurity 
Awareness 
(CA1) I follow news and developments about virus technology. 
(CA2) I follow news and developments about anti-virus technology. 
(Revised from original) 
(CA3) I discuss Internet security issues with friends and people around 
me.  
(CA4) I read about the problems of malicious software intruding into 
Internet users’ computers. 
(CA5) I seek advice from various sources on anti-virus products. 
(Revised from original) 
(CA6) I am aware of spyware problems and consequences. 
 
 
4.4.7. Internet Structural Assurance. The measurement items for internet 
structural assurance were adopted from McKnight et al. (2002) to assess subjects’ trust of 
the Internet. The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was 
used. Table 4.8 presents the items. 
4.4.8. General Risk-Taking Tendencies. The measurement items for general 
risk-taking tendencies were adopted from Meertens and Lion (2008). The 7-point Likert 




Table 4.8. Measurement Scale for Internet Structural Assurance 




(ISA1) The Internet has enough safeguards to make me feel 
comfortable using it for online transactions. 
(ISA2) I feel assured that legal structures adequately protect me from 
problems on the Internet. (Revised from original) 
(ISA3) I feel assured that technological structures adequately protect 
me from problems on the Internet. (Revised from original) 
(ISA4) I feel confident that technological advances on the Internet 
make it safe for me to carry out online transactions. 




Table 4.9. Measurement Scale for General Risk-Taking Tendencies 




(GRT1) Safety first. (Reverse coded) 
(GRT2) I prefer to avoid risks. (Reverse coded) 
(GRT3) I take risks regularly. 
(GRT4) I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen. (Reverse 
coded) 
(GRT5) I enjoy taking risks. (Revised from original) 
(GRT6) In general, I view myself as a ... (Risk avoider = 1 to Risk 
Seeker = 7) 
 
 
4.4.9. Computer Security Risk-Taking Tendencies. Based on the measurement 
items for general risk-taking tendencies from Meertens and Lion (2008), we developed 7 
measurement items for computer security risk-taking tendencies. The 7-point Likert scale 
(strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used except for item 7 (see Table 4.10). 
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Table 4.10. Measurement Scale for Computer Security Risk-Taking Tendencies 





(CSRT1) I do not take risks with computer security. (Reverse coded) 
(CSRT2) I generally avoid computer security risks. (Reverse coded) 
(CSRT3) I play it safe with computer security risks. (Reverse coded) 
(CSRT4) I prefer to avoid computer security risks. (Reverse coded) 
(CSRT5) I am not afraid of taking computer security risks. 
(CSRT6) I am willing to take risks with computer security. 
(CSRT7) With regard to computer security, I view myself as a ... (Risk 
Avoider = 1 to Risk Seeker = 7) 
 
 
4.4.10. Framing Manipulation Check. The manipulation check question for 
framing was developed to assess whether the framing manipulation was effective. 
Subjects were asked to make a selection that comprises two options.  
In the previous scenarios, what kind of information was provided? (Please check 
ALL that apply): 
• Option 1: Number of people’s computers that were safe and secure 
• Option 2: Number of people’s computers that were infected with viruses 
and crashed unexpectedly 
4.4.11. Subject Background Questionnaire. The background questionnaire 
included participants’ demographics (e.g., gender, age, education, major) and Internet 
usage habits (e.g., approximately how many hours do you spend online per week?).  
Please refer to Appendix D for a complete list of items. 
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5. DATA ANALYSIS 
Subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). In total, 205 
people participated in the study, including 75 MTurk master workers and 130 MTurk 
non-master workers. Among the 205 participants, 8 master workers and 19 non-master 
workers did not pass the manipulation check question and/or attention check questions. 
The final sample size of the study is 178 after removing those invalid data points.  
We utilized SPSS software to analyze the data collected. This section presents the 
demographic information of the subjects and the reliability and validity of the 
measurement. Factor analysis and validity checks on the measurement scales were 
conducted and the hypotheses were assessed using repeated measures ANOVA and 
mixed model regression. 
 
5.1. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF SUBJECTS 
The demographic details of the subjects are summarized in Table 5.1.  
 
 












Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects (cont.) 
65-74 3.4% 
75-84 0.0% 
85 or older 0.0% 
Race and Ethnicity 
White 70.2% 
Black or African American 10.1% 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 1.7% 
Asian 13.5% 







Never Married 45.5% 
Education Level 
Less than high school degree 0.6% 
High school graduate (including GED) 7.9% 
Some college but no degree 15.7% 
Associate degree in college (2-year) 11.8% 
Bachelor's degree in college (4-year) 46.1% 
Master's degree 14.6% 
Doctoral degree 2.8% 
Professional degree (JD, MD) 0.6% 
Employment Status 
Employed full time 70.8% 
Employed part time 15.7% 
Unemployed looking for work 2.8% 




Management, professional, and related 46.1% 
Sales and office 23% 






Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects (cont.) 
Personal Income (Previous Year, Before Taxes) 
Less than $10,000 13.5% 
$10,000 to $29,999 24.2% 
$30,000 to $49,999 24.2% 
$50,000 to $69,999 18% 
$70,000 to $89,999 12.4% 
$90,000 to $109,999 2.8% 
$110,000 to $129,999 
 
2.8% 
$130,000 to $149,999 0.6% 
$150,000 or more 1.1% 
Prefer not to disclose 0.6% 
Family Income (Previous Year, Before Taxes) 
Less than $10,000 6.7% 
$10,000 to $49,999 36.5% 
$50,000 to $99,999 39.9% 
$100,000 to $149,999 10.1% 
$150,000 to $199,999 2.8% 
$200,000 to $249,999 1.7% 
$250,000 or more 1.1% 
Prefer not to disclose 1.1% 
Disposable Income (Per Month) 
Less Than $100 20.8% 
$100 - $500 38.8% 
$501 - $1000 19.1% 
$1001 - $2000 14.6% 
More Than $2000 6.7% 
Time Spent Online (Per Week) 
1-5 hours 3.9% 
6 - 10 hours 12.9% 
11-15 hours 13.5% 
16-20 hours 14.6% 
20+ hours 55.1% 
Frequency of Software Download from Unknown Sources 
Never 50.0% 
Sometimes 43.3% 
About half of the time 2.8% 




5.2. MEASUREMENT VALIDATION 
To evaluate convergent and discriminant validity for the constructs in the 
questionnaire, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was carried out. The EFA results using 
Varimax Rotation and Principal Component Analysis are shown in Table 5.2. An eight-
factor structure was generated with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis (with all measurements)  
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DI1_L 0.878 -0.225 0.202 -0.027 0.075 -0.047 0.120 -0.185 
DI3_L 0.874 -0.228 0.180 -0.008 0.079 -0.069 0.109 -0.211 
DI2_L 0.871 -0.251 0.174 0.023 0.068 -0.048 0.124 -0.179 
DI2_M 0.857 -0.297 0.235 0.084 0.100 0.022 0.114 -0.021 
DI1_M 0.850 -0.316 0.243 0.062 0.096 0.043 0.152 0.004 
DI1_S 0.841 -0.326 0.238 0.088 0.099 0.009 0.041 0.141 
DI3_M 0.840 -0.307 0.241 0.090 0.073 0.034 0.127 0.029 
DI3_S 0.833 -0.331 0.196 0.116 0.095 0.001 0.017 0.147 
DI2_S 0.821 -0.359 0.219 0.062 0.089 -0.016 0.050 0.165 
PR3_S -0.197 0.895 -0.120 0.014 -0.089 -0.018 -0.041 -0.162 
PR1_S -0.231 0.879 -0.147 -0.004 -0.112 -0.022 -0.038 -0.206 
PR2_S -0.259 0.868 -0.112 0.003 -0.121 -0.020 0.007 -0.178 
PR1_M -0.316 0.857 -0.135 -0.011 -0.148 0.029 -0.080 0.072 
PR2_M -0.285 0.854 -0.144 -0.059 -0.076 0.044 -0.096 0.017 
PR3_M -0.263 0.842 -0.134 -0.060 -0.069 0.050 -0.105 0.079 
PR1_L -0.316 0.760 -0.114 0.103 -0.121 0.097 -0.049 0.429 
PR3_L -0.318 0.733 -0.156 0.125 -0.139 0.052 -0.084 0.455 
PR2_L -0.309 0.708 -0.140 0.055 -0.131 0.089 -0.064 0.468 
GRT5 0.108 -0.132 0.845 -0.016 -0.050 0.174 -0.021 0.031 
GRT6 0.301 -0.097 0.823 -0.037 -0.010 0.066 -0.013 0.007 




Table 5.2. Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis (with all measurements) (cont.) 
GRT2 0.274 -0.120 0.785 0.089 0.073 -0.029 0.133 -0.071 
GRT4 0.024 -0.102 0.685 0.029 0.158 -0.022 0.054 -0.010 
GRT1 0.289 -0.185 0.660 -0.001 0.035 -0.149 0.297 -0.100 
SE3 0.138 -0.056 0.088 0.804 0.141 0.079 0.000 0.156 
SE1 0.311 -0.066 0.182 0.743 0.151 0.000 0.036 0.090 
SE2 0.185 -0.027 0.055 0.716 0.287 0.086 0.053 0.213 
GISA2 0.033 -0.056 0.019 0.768 0.090 0.243 -0.005 -0.075 
GISA1 -0.221 -0.017 -0.083 0.658 0.125 0.327 -0.050 -0.252 
GISA3 -0.077 0.218 -0.051 0.652 0.083 0.291 -0.340 -0.172 
ISA4 0.127 -0.111 0.025 0.154 0.811 0.044 0.014 -0.001 
ISA3 0.246 -0.114 0.043 0.118 0.791 -0.060 0.046 0.022 
ISA1 0.018 -0.127 0.091 0.164 0.786 -0.064 0.080 -0.112 
ISA5 -0.105 -0.150 0.066 0.225 0.692 0.094 0.130 -0.090 
ISA2 0.349 -0.134 0.184 -0.004 0.671 0.127 -0.123 0.214 
CA1 -0.073 -0.039 0.081 0.244 0.036 0.816 0.146 0.099 
CA2 -0.035 -0.005 0.050 0.238 0.012 0.815 0.195 0.097 
CA3 0.065 -0.001 0.023 0.089 0.051 0.712 -0.157 0.005 
CA5 -0.016 0.094 0.085 0.116 -0.032 0.67 -0.159 -0.216 
CA4 0.013 0.089 -0.036 0.370 0.003 0.571 -0.102 0.091 
CA6 -0.134 0.125 -0.149 0.702 0.011 0.335 -0.034 -0.067 
CSRT2 0.410 -0.138 0.519 -0.110 0.081 -0.093 0.587 -0.111 
CSRT3 0.450 -0.114 0.421 -0.176 0.073 -0.162 0.575 0.030 
CSRT6 0.401 -0.199 0.482 -0.009 0.131 0.068 0.557 0.031 
CSRT4 0.471 -0.134 0.423 -0.083 0.114 -0.130 0.513 -0.057 
CSRT1 0.436 -0.152 0.436 -0.016 0.163 0.012 0.472 0.013 
CSRT5 0.377 -0.167 0.550 0.023 0.103 0.057 0.311 -0.084 
CSRT7 0.554 -0.015 0.595 -0.051 0.103 -0.019 0.218 0.122 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 





As shown in Table 5.2, Self-Efficacy (SE) and General Information Security 
Awareness (GISA) load together. In reviewing the items for GISA, it is noted that they 
tapped on knowledge and awareness of information security, and hence, are very similar 
to SE. Since there is another measurement for computer security awareness (i.e., 
Cybersecurity Awareness (CA)) that was assessed based on actions and behavior 
associated with awareness of cybersecurity, all items of GISA were dropped while those 
of CA were retained. However, since item CA6 did not load well, it was removed. In 
addition, Computer Security Risk-Taking Tendencies (CSRT) loaded with General Risk-
Taking Tendencies (GRT), and hence, we decided to retain GRT and discard CSRT. The 
rest of the measurement items loaded onto their target factors, which suggests good 
construct validity (Cook, et al., 1979).  
After removing construct GISA, CSRT, and item CA6, we ran the factor analysis 
again. Table 5.3 provides the results of EFA after the adjustments.  
 
 
Table 5.3. Results of Factor Analysis (after removing GISA, CSRT, and CA6)  
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DI1_L 0.892 -0.250 0.187 0.093 -0.058 -0.028 
DI3_L 0.887 -0.254 0.166 0.102 -0.075 -0.019 
DI2_L 0.883 -0.272 0.166 0.090 -0.053 0.021 
DI2_M 0.863 -0.305 0.220 0.110 0.027 0.115 
DI1_M 0.857 -0.325 0.229 0.102 0.044 0.115 
DI1_S 0.845 -0.312 0.223 0.080 0.040 0.138 
DI3_M 0.840 -0.315 0.217 0.096 0.013 0.165 
DI3_S 0.827 -0.319 0.171 0.091 0.009 0.191 




Table 5.3. Results of Factor Analysis (after removing GISA, CSRT, and CA6) (cont.) 
PR3_S -0.186 0.884 -0.104 -0.064 -0.016 -0.080 
PR1_S -0.312 0.864 -0.128 -0.149 0.025 -0.050 
PR2_S -0.219 0.863 -0.129 -0.086 -0.022 -0.113 
PR2_M -0.277 0.859 -0.135 -0.074 0.032 -0.113 
PR1_M -0.245 0.854 -0.089 -0.096 -0.018 -0.093 
PR3_M -0.259 0.852 -0.123 -0.074 0.040 -0.092 
PR1_L -0.320 0.801 -0.105 -0.148 0.103 0.163 
PR3_L -0.327 0.780 -0.147 -0.165 0.066 0.191 
PR2_L -0.314 0.754 -0.129 -0.162 0.091 0.135 
GRT5 0.130 -0.129 0.835 -0.040 0.170 -0.029 
GRT3 0.246 -0.145 0.803 0.074 0.155 0.113 
GRT6 0.310 -0.108 0.800 -0.006 0.075 0.012 
GRT2 0.299 -0.129 0.792 0.096 -0.013 0.100 
GRT1 0.324 -0.201 0.700 0.065 -0.157 0.029 
GRT4 0.043 -0.105 0.690 0.166 -0.018 0.044 
ISA4 0.121 -0.107 0.022 0.819 0.057 0.125 
ISA1 0.026 -0.133 0.088 0.808 -0.060 0.089 
ISA3 0.237 -0.119 0.022 0.789 -0.051 0.131 
ISA5 -0.099 -0.152 0.079 0.717 0.108 0.155 
ISA2 0.327 -0.129 0.122 0.634 0.123 0.078 
CA1 -0.056 -0.016 0.123 0.058 0.831 0.146 
CA2 -0.014 0.016 0.099 0.039 0.826 0.134 
CA3 0.048 -0.003 -0.020 0.049 0.736 0.011 
CA5 -0.033 0.064 0.033 -0.015 0.706 -0.026 
CA4 -0.008 0.105 -0.054 0.011 0.625 0.305 
SE3 0.096 -0.031 0.064 0.165 0.205 0.847 
SE1 0.274 -0.053 0.155 0.182 0.122 0.786 
SE2 0.140 -0.011 0.017 0.302 0.204 0.777 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 





Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of at least 0.70 indicate good reliability of the 
constructs (Nunnally et al., 1967). All of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients shown in 
Table 5.4 are above 0.7, suggesting that all the measures and their respective 
measurement components are reliable. 
 
 
Table 5.4. Results of Reliability Analysis 
Variable Cronbach's Alpha 
Download Intention (DI) (3 items) 0.986 
Perceived Risk (PR) (3 items) 0.972 
Self-Efficacy (SE) (3 items) 0.870 
Cybersecurity Awareness (CA) (5 items) 0.819 
Internet Structural Assurance (ISA) (5 items) 0.848 
General Risk-Taking Tendencies (GRT) (6 items) 0.899 
 
 
5.3. REPEATED MEASURES ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Repeated measures refer to measures that are repeated with the same subject. 
Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) is also referred to as within-subjects 
ANOVA. Repeated measures ANOVA is used to assess overall differences between 
related means differences in mean scores for two or more within-subjects conditions. 
Moreover, it is appropriate to use a repeated measures ANOVA only if the data "passes" 
five assumptions (Field, 2009). 
1. The dependent variable should be measured at the continuous level (i.e., interval 
or ratio scale; ordinal scale is also acceptable). 
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2. The within-subjects variable should consist of at least two levels. 
3. There should be no significant outliers in the related groups. The problem with 
outliers is that they might have a negative effect on the repeated measures 
ANOVA, distorting the differences between the related groups (whether 
increasing or decreasing the scores on the dependent variable), and can reduce the 
accuracy of the results. 
4. The distribution of the dependent variable in the two or more related groups 
should be approximately normally distributed. However, this assumption is not 
needed if the sample size is greater than 25. 
5. The variances of the differences between all combinations of related groups 
should be equal or approximately equal.  
5.3.1. Check for Assumptions. The sample size of this study is 178. Base Size is 
the within-subjects variable that has three levels (small, medium and large); framing is 
the between-subjects factor with two levels (positive and negative); and the outcome or 
dependent factor is perceived risk which is measured at the continuous level (i.e., ordinal 
scale can be approximated to be continuous). Thus, the data meet assumptions 1, 2, and 4. 
To test assumptions 3, we ran analyses in SPSS to detect possible outliers at each 
level of the repeated measures in our data. The results of outlier detection are provided in 
Figure 5.1-5.3. 
SPSS makes a distinction between outliers that are more than 1.5 box lengths 
from one hinge of the box (using a circle) and outliers that are more than 3 box lengths 
from a hinge (using an asterisk). Based on an examination of the boxplots, SPSS does not 
identify any outliers since there is no circle or asterisk in Figures 5.1-5.3. Thus, our data 













Figure 5.3. SPSS Explore Output: Boxplot for Perceived Risk in Large Base Size 
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Assumption 5 requires the variances of the differences between all combinations 
of related groups to be equal (i.e., Sphericity). Sphericity is tested with the Mauchly’s test 
(Mauchly, 1940). When the probability of Mauchly’s test is greater than a (i.e., p > 0.05 
with a usually set to 0.05), the variances are equal and thus sphericity has not been 
violated. Since the results of Mauchly’s test of our data show that sphericity is violated 
(i.e., p < 0.05), we use alternatives ways for estimating the amount of sphericity. In 
SPSS, three alternative methods are also generated: Greenhouse-Geisser, Huynh-Feldt, 
and the lower-bound (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959; Huynh & Feldt, 1976). If Mauchly’s 
test of sphericity is violated, these methods are used to correct the within-subjects tests. 
The Greenhouse-Geisser and Huynd-Feldt corrections estimate 𝜀 in order to correct the 
degrees of freedom of the F-distribution. These corrections have elicited a more accurate 
significance value as they increase the p-value to compensate for the fact that the test is 
too liberal when sphericity is violated. Moreover, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
tends to underestimate 𝜀 when 𝜀 is close to 1 and thus it is a conservative correction, 
whereas the Huynd-Feldt correction tends to overestimate 𝜀 so it is a more liberal 
correction.  
5.3.2. Results of Repeated Measures ANOVA. Given that there is a within-
subjects factor (base size) and a between-subjects factor (framing) in the research design, 
we used the repeated measures ANOVA for testing H1, H2 and H3.  
5.3.2.1. Tests of between-subjects effects (framing). Section 5.3.2.1 presents the 
results of the main effect of Framing, a between-subjects factor. Table 5.5 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the effect of Positive and Negative Framing on Perceived Risk. 
As shown in Table 5.5, the mean for Perceived Risk is higher in Negative Framing than 
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for Positive Framing. Figure 5.4 shows a diagram of the main effect of framing across all 
three levels of base size in negative framing and positive framing. 
 
 
Table 5.5. Descriptive Statistics of Between-Subjects Effects for Framing 
Framing Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Negative 3.83 1.02 3.63 4.03 




Figure 5.4. Main Effect of Framing Across Three Levels of Base Size 
 
 
In addition, Table 5.6 shows the results of the Framing main effect on Perceived 
Risk, along with 17 covariates in the following three categories: 
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• Demographic Factors (10): Gender, Age, Ethnicity, Marital Status, 
Education, Employment Status, Occupation, Annual Personal Income, Annual 
Household Income, and Disposable Income or Allowance. 
• Computer Usage (2): Hours Spent Online Per Week, Frequency of 
Download Software from Unknown Sources. 
• Individual Traits (4): Internet Structural Assurance, General Risk-Taking 
Tendencies, Cybersecurity Awareness, and Self-Efficacy. 
In Table 5.6, Sum of Squares is the sum of the squares of the deviations from the 
means. Degree of Freedom (df) represents the degree of freedom of the coefficients for 
the test. Mean Square is found by dividing the Sum of Squares by the Degree of 
Freedom. F refers to the ratio of two independent chi-squared variables divided by their 
respective degrees of freedom. Sig. refers to the 2-tailed p-value to test if the value of the 
null hypothesis is 0. For our data analysis, we compared each p-value to our preselected 
alpha threshold of 0.05. Coefficients that have a p-value less than the preselected alpha 
value is considered to be statistically significant. 
Framing. We found that framing has a significant effect on Perceived Risk, p < 
0.001. Subjects who were in Negative Framing exhibited greater Perceived Risk than 
those in Positive Framing (Mean = 3.83, SD = 1.08) than subjects who were in Positive 
Framing (Mean = 3.10, SD = 1.02). Hence, H1 is supported. 
Internet Structural Assurance (ISA). We found a significant effect of Internet 
Structural Assurance on Perceived Risk, p = 0.004 (< 0.05). Subjects who are high in ISA 
perceived lower risks of downloading the software for free from the uncertified source.  
General Risk-Taking Tendencies (GRT). We found a significant effect of General 
Risk-Taking Tendencies on Perceived Risk, p < 0.001. Subjects who are high in General 
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Risk-Taking Tendencies perceived lower risks of downloading the software for free from 
the uncertified source. 
 
 
Table 5.6. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Intercept 89.33 1 89.33 43.71 0.000 
Framing 49.90 1 49.9 24.42 0.000 
Self-Efficacy 0.47 1 0.47 0.23 0.632 
Cybersecurity 
Awareness 1.72 1 1.72 0.84 0.361 
Internet Structural 
Assurance 16.60 1 16.60 8.12 0.005 
General Risk-
Taking Tendencies 31.93 1 31.93 15.62 0.000 
Gender 0.85 1 0.85 0.41 0.521 
Age 4.92 1 4.92 2.41 0.123 
Ethnicity 13.36 1 13.36 6.54 0.012 
Marital Status 0.60 1 0.60 0.29 0.589 
Degree 0.98 1 0.98 0.48 0.489 
Employment Status 7.35 1 7.35 3.60 0.060 
Occupation 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.974 
Personal Income 0.19 1 0.19 0.09 0.763 
Household Income 0.76 1 0.76 0.37 0.543 
Disposable Income 15.03 1 15.03 7.36 0.007 









All other covariates with the exception of disposable income and ethnicity are not 
significant. Disposable income and ethnicity have effects on perceived risk of users. 
People who have the lowest and highest disposable income brackets perceived the 
lightest risks. Since we have a large number of white subjects (70%), we compared them 
with the rest of the subjects and found a difference in their risk perceptions.  
5.3.2.2. Tests of within-subjects effects (base size). In this section, Table 5.7 
provides the descriptive statistics and shows the means for Perceived Risk at the different 
levels of Base Size and Framing. Table 5.8 shows the results of repeated measures 
ANOVA which indicates the overall significance of the within-subjects effect of Base 
Size and the interaction effect of Framing and Base Size. As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, 
since our data violate the assumption of sphericity (i.e., equal variances), we use the 
values of the "Greenhouse-Geisser" test instead of “Sphericity Assumed”.  
 
 
Table 5.7. Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Risk at Three Levels of Base Size 
Base Size Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence 




Small 3.31 1.15 3.15 3.47 
Negative 3.68 1.08 
Positive 2.94 1.10 
Total 3.31 1.15 
Medium 3.45 1.07 3.30 3.60 
Negative 3.80 0.99 
Positive 3.10 1.04 
Total 3.45 1.07 
Large 3.64 1.09 3.49 3.79 
Negative 4.01 0.97 
Positive 3.27 1.08 




Table 5.8. Tests of Within-Subjects Effects of Base Size 
Source Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Base 
Size 
Sphericity Assumed 9.73 2.00 4.86 17.07 0.00 
Greenhouse-Geisser 9.73 1.76 5.53 17.07 0.00 
Huynh-Feldt 9.73 1.79 5.44 17.07 0.00 




Sphericity Assumed 0.04 2.00 0.02 0.07 0.93 
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.04 1.76 0.02 0.07 0.91 
Huynh-Feldt 0.04 1.79 0.02 0.07 0.91 




Sphericity Assumed 100.31 352.00 0.29   
Greenhouse-Geisser 100.31 309.88 0.32   
Huynh-Feldt 100.31 314.55 0.32   
Lower-bound 100.31 176 0.57   
 
 
Base size. According to the results of repeated measures ANOVA with a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction presented in Table 5.7, the mean scores for Perceived 
Risk are statistically different (p < 0.001) between the different levels of Base Size. The 
results illustrate that subjects perceived greater risk (Mean = 3.64, SD = 1.09) when 
provided the scenario with large base size than with small base size (Mean = 3.31, SD = 
1.15) and medium base size (Mean = 3.45, SD = 1.07). Since the overall ANOVA results 
for the three levels of base size are significant, we also ran the post-hoc tests to see which 
levels of Base Size are different. According to the post-hoc tests presented in Table 5.9, 
there is a significant effect across every level of Base Size on Perceived Risk. We can see 
that there is a significant difference in Perceived Risk between small and medium Base 
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Size (p = 0.01 < 0.05, MD = 0.14), between small and large Base Size (p < 0.001, MD = 
0.33), and between medium and large Base Size (p < 0.001, MD = 0.19). From the Mean 
Difference column, we can see that as the Base Size increases, Perceived Risk is also 
significantly increased. Hence, H2 is supported. 
 
 
Table 5.9. Results of the Bonferroni Post-Hoc Tests 










Medium -0.14 0.05 0.01 -0.24 -0.04 
Large -0.33 0.07 0.00 -0.46 -0.20 
Medium 
Small 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.24 
Large -0.19 0.05 0.00 -0.29 -0.09 
Large 
Small 0.33 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.46 
Medium 0.19 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.29 
 
 
Framing*Base Size. According to the results of repeated measures ANOVA with 
a Greenhouse-Geisser correction presented in Table 5.7, there is no interaction effect 





5.4. MIXED MODEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
We measured Perceived Risk, Download Intention, and Download Decision as 
repeated measures at small, medium, and large levels of base size in the study. As 
Repeated Measures ANOVA can only treat a repeated measures as a categorical factor, 
we conducted Mixed Model Regression Analysis to test H4 and H5.  
A mixed model is a statistical model containing both fixed effects and random 
effects. They are particularly useful in settings where repeated measurements are made 
on the same statistical units (longitudinal study), or where measurements are made on 
clusters of related statistical units (Lindstrom & Bates, 1990).  In the Mixed Model 
approach, each subject has three rows of data. A new column is generated to indicate the 
level of Base Size and the outcomes (i.e., Perceived Risk, Download Intention, and 
Download Decision) are single variables. Covariates have repeated values across the 
three rows of data. This is called the long format, or Stacked data, and this changes the 
unit of analysis from the subject to each measurement occasion. 
The results of Mixed Model Regression Analysis for Download Intention are 
presented in Table 5.10, and the results of Mixed Model Regression Analysis for 
Download Decision are presented in Table 5.11.  
 
 
Table 5.10. Tests of Perceived Risk Effects on Download Decision 
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 463.72 363.30 0.00 
Perceived Risk 12 403.64 25.64 0.00 




Download Intention. From the result of the analysis as shown in Table 5.10, we 
found a significant effect of Perceived Risk on Download Intention, p < 0.001. Subjects 
who perceived greater risks have lower download intentions. Hence, H4 is supported. 
 
 
Table 5.11. Tests of Download Intention Effects on Download Behavior  
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 411.36 3612.96 0.00 
Download Intention 18 436.36 62.32 0.00 
a. Dependent Variable: Download Decision. 
 
 
Download Decision. From the result of the analysis as shown in Table 5.11, we 
found a significant effect of Download Intention on Download Decision, p < 0.001. 
Download intentions are positively associated with download decisions. Hence, H5 is 
supported. 
Table 5.12 summarizes the results of hypothesis testing. In sum, H1, H2, H4, and 





Table 5.12. Results of Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis Supported? 
H1: Risk perception is higher in negative framing than positive 
framing. Yes 
H2: The greater the base size, the higher the perceived risk. Yes 
H3: As base size increases, framing effect on perceived risk 
becomes stronger. No 
H4: The greater the perceived risk, the lower the download 
intention. Yes 




6. DISCUSSIONS  
The results of our study provide further evidence to the literature that framing 
influences users’ perceptions of risks. In addition, the results demonstrate that base size, 
manipulated through the number of people who downloaded the software, influences 
users’ perceived risks. However, the results do not demonstrate the interaction effect of 
base size and framing on users’ behavior found by Wang and Johnston (1995) as the 
framing effect in our study is consistent across all base size conditions. Hence, based on 
our study, base size does not moderate the effect of framing on perceived risk. The 
findings also suggest that users’ perceived risk has a significant effect on users’ 
download intention, and users’ download intention is positively associated with users’ 
download decision.  
First, negative framing leads to higher perceived risk than positive framing. 
According to Prospect Theory, a loss is assessed at a relatively greater value than a gain. 
The finding is in line with Prospect Theory and suggests that users’ perception of 
computer security risk is higher in the negative framing condition than in the positive 
framing condition.  
Second, base size has a significant impact on users’ perceived risk. The larger the 
base size, the greater the perceived risk. As base size increases, the perceived probability 
of virus infection increases and thus, users’ perceived risk increases.  
Moreover, the results have shown that the greater the perceived risk, the lower the 
intention to download software applications that involve computer security risks. Hence, 
providing computer security risk information with negative framing is an effective way to 
reduce or minimize computer security risk-taking behavior. 
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Hence, users are less likely to download software applications when the risk 





7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
The study has several limitations, which can be resolved or addressed in future 
research. 
First, the data collection of this study was conducted on MTurk to ensure a 
diverse sample across different age groups, ethnicity, occupation, etc. However, MTurk 
does not operate in a controlled environment, thus we cannot ensure subjects were 
focused and not distracted by interference in their surroundings during the study. In 
future research, we would like to recruit subjects to participate in a controlled laboratory 
experiment to validate the results.  
Second, the study utilized a scenario-based survey approach to manipulate the 
experimental scenarios. It did not simulate any actual uncertified software downloads 
which could have made the experimental scenarios more realistic. This limitation could 
be overcome in future research by simulating more realistic-looking websites involving 
decisions on uncertified software downloads and hence, make the experimental 
conditions look more realistic or similar to those encountered in real life.  
Third, many participants felt that the questionnaire is a bit long as we have a large 
number of demographic questions. We intended to use the demographic items as 
covariates in our study, so we used a fairly comprehensive set of subject demographic 
questions. However, since demographic questions are generally straight-forward to 
answer (i.e., do not require much thought or cognitive processing to answer them), we 
placed them at the end of the questionnaire because errors due to fatigue were less likely 
to happen for demographic questions compared to other types of questions. Furthermore, 
we included attention check questions and eliminated data points that were problematic 
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due to lack of attention by the subjects. Future studies can overcome this potential 
limitation by further refining the demographic items. 
Fourth, we captured and analyzed only a few traits such as cybersecurity 
awareness, self-efficacy, and risk-taking tendencies. In future research, other personality 
traits such as the big five factors of personality could also be studied. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS  
This research examines the impact of positively and negatively framed security 
risk information and base size on computer security risk perceptions of users. It also 
investigates the relationship between risk perceptions and download intentions, as well as 
download intentions and download decisions. In addition, it examines the effects of 
various demographic factors and personality traits on perceived risks, e.g., gender, age, 
cybersecurity awareness, internet structural assurance, and risk-taking tendencies. 
Our findings are significant because negative framing is indeed the way computer 
security risks should be presented to decision makers. Drawing on Prospect Theory, this 
study focuses on understanding whether negatively framed cybersecurity risk information 
could lead users to engage in less risk-taking or more conservative online behavior as 
compared to positively framed cybersecurity risk information. The findings suggest that 
the framing of risk information has a significant effect on users’ behavior. More 
specifically, negative framing increases users’ perceived risk, leading to risk-averse 
behavior, which is consistent with Prospect Theory in that people weigh losses greater 
than gains of the same amount or magnitude. 
The experimental conditions of our study are different other studies on framing 
effect and decision-making in information science context (Beebe et al., 2014, Rosoff et 
al., 2013, and Valecha et al., 2016). Our study presented one situation with two different 
frames, i.e., negatively framed scenario vs. positively framed scenario, whereas their 
studies provided two opposite scenarios, which are gain vs. loss or reward-based phishing 
email vs. threat-based phishing email. Moreover, our results are different from the results 
of Chen et al., (2015), which suggest that positive framing decreases risk-taking behavior. 
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Their study provides two conditions: the amount of safety and the amount of risks of an 
app installation. However, safety differs from risks because safety seems to be an 
integrated concept and people rarely talk about the dimensions for safety, but risk is a 
multi-dimension concept that generally is regarded to comprise three dimensions: 
probability, assets, and consequences. Thus, people may tend to think of overall safety 
but components of risks. The positive/negative framing in our study seems to be balanced 
as we provided two conditions that are logically opposite to each other: among a group of 
people, the number of people’s computers that were infected with viruses vs. the number 
of people’s computers that were secure. 
This study also explores the base size effect, which supports the idea that people 
tend to be less risk seeking as base size increases, as discussed by Wang and Johnston 
(1995), and Levin and Chapman (1990). In our study, the base size effect was found in 
both positive and negative framing. The results demonstrate that base size affects 
people’s risk perceptions such that the greater the base size, the higher the perceived risk. 
Data analysis was also carried out to study the effect of personality traits, such as 
cybersecurity awareness, general risk-taking tendencies, and Internet structural on users’ 
perceived computer security risk. We found a significant effect of users’ perceived 
Internet structural assurance on perceived risk. Users who have higher internet structural 
assurance are more likely to perceive less risk of downloading software from uncertified 
sources. Moreover, there is a negative effect of general risk-taking tendencies on 
perceived risk. Users with higher general risk-taking tendencies perceive less risks of 
downloading software from uncertified sources. 
In summary, this study offers insights on the impact of framing and base size in 
the context of computer security. With the knowledge gained from this research, we hope 
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to design better warning systems to mitigate the risks undertaken by users. The findings 
from this research study can also be applied to train employees about avoiding dangerous 
software downloads by presenting training materials more effectively and thereby 






































1. POSITIVELY FRAMED SCENARIO 
1.1 Small Base Size 
 
 





1.3 Large Base Size 
 
 
2. NEGATIVELY FRAMED SCENARIO 






2.2 Medium Base Size
 
 

























(PR1) Please indicate how risky you perceive the action of 
downloading this software for free from the uncertified source. 
(PR2) Please indicate the level of risk of downloading this software for 
free from the uncertified source. 
(PR3) Please rate the riskiness of downloading this software for free 
from the uncertified source. 
Download 
Intention 
(DI1) I intend to download this software for free from the uncertified 
source. 
(DI2) I plan to download this software for free from the uncertified 
source. 




What is your choice of downloading this software? 
• Option 1: Download and pay for the expensive software from 
the certified source with no security risks 
• Option 2: Download the software for free from this uncertified 





(GISA1) Overall, I am aware of potential security threats and their 
negative consequences. 
(GISA2) I have sufficient knowledge about the effect of potential 
security problems. (Revised from original) 
(GISA3) I understand the concerns regarding the risks posed by 
information security. 
Self-Efficacy 
(SE1) I am confident that I can remove viruses from my computer. 
(SE2) I am confident that I can prevent unauthorized intrusion into my 
computer. 
(SE3) I believe I can configure my computer to protect it from viruses. 
Cybersecurity 
Awareness 
(CA1) I follow news and developments about virus technology. 
(CA2) I follow news and developments about anti-virus technology. 
(Revised from original) 
(CA3) I discuss Internet security issues with friends and people around 
me. 
(CA4) I read about the problems of malicious software intruding into 
Internet users’ computers. 
(CA5) I seek advice from various sources on anti-virus products. 
(Revised from original) 




(ISA1) The Internet has enough safeguards to make me feel 
comfortable using it for online transactions. 
(ISA2) I feel assured that legal structures adequately protect me from 
problems on the Internet. (Revised from original) 
(ISA3) I feel assured that technological structures adequately protect 
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me from problems on the Internet. (Revised from original) 
(ISA4) I feel confident that technological advances on the Internet 
make it safe for me to carry out online transactions. 





(GRT1) Safety first. (Reverse coded) 
(GRT2) I prefer to avoid risks. (Reverse coded) 
(GRT3) I take risks regularly. 
(GRT4) I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen. (Reverse 
coded) 
(GRT5) I enjoy taking risks. (Revised from original) 
(GRT6) In general, I view myself as a ... (Risk avoider = 1 to Risk 





(CSRT1) I do not take risks with computer security. (Reverse coded) 
(CSRT2) I generally avoid computer security risks. (Reverse coded) 
(CSRT3) I play it safe with computer security risks. (Reverse coded) 
(CSRT4) I prefer to avoid computer security risks. (Reverse coded) 
(CSRT5) I am not afraid of taking computer security risks. 
(CSRT6) I am willing to take risks with computer security. 
(CSRT7) With regard to computer security, I view myself as a ... (Risk 




In the previous scenarios, what kind of information was provided? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
• Option 1: Number of people's computers that were safe and 
secure 
• Option 2: Number of people's computers that were infected 



















1. What is your gender? (Male, Female, Other) 
2. How old are you? (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85 or older) 
3. Please specify your ethnicity. (White, Black or African American, American Indian 
or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Other, and Prefer Not 
to Disclose) 
4. What is your marital status? (Married, Widowed, Divorced, Separated, and Never 
Married) 
5. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you 
have received? (Less than high school degree, High school graduate (high school 
diploma or equivalent including GED), Some college but no degree, Associate 
degree in college (2-year), Bachelor's degree in college (4-year), Master's degree, 
Doctoral degree, and Professional degree (JD, MD)) 
6. With regard to your education, what is your major area of study? (Please Specify) 
7. Which of the following best describes your current employment status? (Employed 
full time, Employed part time, Unemployed looking for work, Unemployed not 
looking for work, Retired, and Student) 
8. Please indicate your occupation: (Management, professional, and related; Sales and 
office; Farming, fishing, and forestry; Government; Retired; Unemployed and Other 
(Please Specify)) 
9. Which of the following best represents your annual personal income (before taxes) 
in the previous year? (Less than $10,000, $10,000 to $29,999, $30,000 to $49,999, 
$50,000 to $69,999, $70,000 to $89,999, $90,000 to $109,999, $110,000 to 
$129,999, $130,000 to $149,999, $150,000 or more, and Prefer not to disclose)  
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10. Which of the following best represents your annual household income (before taxes) 
in the previous year? (Less than $10,000, $10,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $99,999, 
$100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 or $199,999, $200,000 to 249,999, More than 
$250,000, and Prefer not to disclose)  
11. How much disposable income or allowance (i.e., the money you can spend as you 
want and not the money you spend on taxes, food, shelter and other basic needs) do 
you have per month?  (Less than $100, $100 - $500, $501 - $1000, $1001 - $2000, 
More than $2000) 
12. Approximately how many hours do you spend online per week? (1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 
16-20, 20+) 
13. How frequently do you download software from unknown sources? (Never, 
Sometimes, About half the time, Most of the time, and Always) 
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